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L Introduction
At least forty-three million Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities.! Insurance is critical to these individuals because it provides them with the means to participate fully in society.2 The specific terms
of employer-provided insurance plans, however, often discriminate against
individuals with disabilities and are not as beneficial to those individuals as
they may appear.3
Employers providing insurance to their employees typically purchase a
universal policy directly from an insurance company and then offer coverage
to their employees under that policy.4 These employer-provided policies dis1. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 2(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)
(1994) (stating that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older").
2. See Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 427 (D.N.H. 1996)
(stating that "it is often insurance coverage that will determine a disabled person's ability to
prevent the disability from limiting his or her participation in society" (quoting Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181,193 (6th Cir.), reh"g en bancgrantedandvacated,107
F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1996), reh'genbanc, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
871 (1998))); Kimberly A. Ackourey, Comment, InsuringAmericans with Disabilities: How
FarCan CongressGo to ProtectTraditionalPractices?,40 EMORY L.J. 1183, 1215-16 (1991)
(recognizing that ability of disabled individuals to become independent citizens depends on
prohibition of discrimination in insurance coverage).
3. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (considering discrepancy between long-term disability coverage that employer provides
to employees with physical illnesses and coverage employer provides to employees with mental
illnesses), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 871 (1998); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 14(1st Cir. 1994) (contrasting $25,000 cap on health benefits
for AIDS-related illnesses with $1 million cap that insurer provides to other plan members
under same employer-provided insurance plan); PENSION & WELFARE BENEFrrS ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, TRENDS INHEALTH BENEFITS 231 (John P. Turner et al. eds., 1993) (stating
that some employers restrict long-term disability benefits for individuals with mental disabilities); Stephen M. Koslow & Mark R. White, Employer-SponsoredHealth Benefits Under the
ADA, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 560, 561 (1992) (discussing discriminatory
treatment of disabilities in employer-provided insurance plans); Brian D. Shannon, Pavingthe
Path to Parity in Health Insurance Coveragefor Mental Illness: New Law or Merely Good
Intentions?, 68 U. CoLo. L. REv. 63, 66-67 (1997) (stating that insurance plans typically
provide less coverage for mental health treatment than for physical ailments); Bonnie Poitras
Tucker, InsuranceandtheADA, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 915,925-26 (1997) (noting major dispute
involving health insurance plans that provide less coverage for mental health care than for
physical health care).
4. See JERRY S. ROSENBLOOM & G. VICTORHALLMAN, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANNING
233 (1981) (stating that employers often provide disability income benefits through plans that
insurance companies underwrite); Koslow & White, supra note 3, at 560 (stating that employer
typically provides employer-sponsored health insurance plan that employer purchases from
private insurance company); Ted Storer, Comment, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Will
the InsuranceField Change?, 20 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 1031, 1041 (1994) (stating that some
employers purchase employee benefit plans from insurance companies).
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criminate against employees with disabilities in the following ways: (1) they
often treat physical and mental ailments differently, (2) they regularly exclude
coverage for "pre-existing" conditions, and (3) they frequently exclude certain
ailments or subject those ailments to lower benefit levels.' Individuals with
disabilities face such discrimination in health insurance6 and long-term disability insurance plans.'
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)'
to eliminate discrimination against Americans with disabilities9 and to bring
these individuals into the social and economic mainstream of American life.10
The ADA defines causes of action in terms of the environment in which
discriminatory acts may occur." Title I prohibits discrimination in private
employment,12 Title II prohibits discrimination in public services,13 and Title
II prohibits discrimination by public accommodations. 4
5. See Koslow & White, supra note 3, at 561 (discussing treatment of disabilities by
employer-provided insurance policies).
6. See Shannon, supra note 3, at 66-67 (stating that insurance plans typically provide
less coverage for mental health treatment than for physical ailments); Tucker, supranote 3, at
925-26 (discussing major dispute that exists with respect to disability-based distinctions in
employer-provided health insurance plans); see also infranotes 53-57 and accompanying text
(discussing importance of health insurance to individuals with disabilities).
.7.

See PENSiON &WELFARE BENEFrrS ADMIN., supra note 3, at 231 (stating that some

employers have begun to restrict long-term disability benefits for individuals with mental
disabilities); see also infranotes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing long-term disability
insurance).
8. AmericanswithDisabilitiesActof 1990,Pub.L.No. 101-336,104Stat. 327(codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213) (1994) [hereinafter ADA].
9. See ADA § 2(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994) (describing purpose of ADA);
H.R. REP.No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1990) (same), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304;
S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989) (same).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.1, at 24 (stating that ADA will permit United States
to welcome individuals with disabilities into mainstream of American society), reprintedin
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 268; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (same).
11. See infira notes 12-14 and accompanying text (describing environments in which ADA
provides causes of action).
12. See ADA §§ 101-108,42U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (discussingprohibition ofdiscrimination in area of private employment). Congress refers to this section of the ADA as Title I.
See ADA, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §§ 101-108, 104 Stat. 327, 330-37 (1990) (designating this
section "TITLE I - EMPLOYMENT").
13. See ADA §§ 201-246,42U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (discussingprohibition ofdiscrimination by public entity). Congress refers to this section of the ADA as Title II. See ADA, §§
201-246, 104 Stat. at 337-53 (designating this section "TITLE II - PUBLIC SERVICES").
14. See ADA §§ 301-310,42U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (discussingprohibition ofdiscrimination by public accommodations). Congress refers to this section of the ADA as Title III. See
ADA, §§ 301-310, 104 Stat. at 353-65 (designating this section "TITLE III - PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND SERVICES OPERATED BY PRIVATE ENTITIES").
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Many employees look to the provisions of the ADA for protection from
disability-based terms of their employer-provided insurance plans." Employees sue their employers under Title 1,16 which governs employment practices
and applies to employer-provided insurance. 7 Many employees, however,
also initiate a cause of action against the insurance company that issues the
employer-provided insurance plan on the theory that the insurance company
violated Title III.1" Title III, perhaps the broadest title in the ADA, 9 prohibits
discrimination by people who own, lease, or operate places of public accommodation,2" including insurance offices.2 '
15. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (discussing employee's ADA claims based on discriminatory terms in employer-provided
insurance plan), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive
Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1994) (same); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982
F. Supp. 1158, 1159-60 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same); Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank, 967 F.
Supp. 802, 803-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same); Pappas v. BethesdaHosp. Ass'n, 861 F. Supp. 616,
617-18 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (same).
16. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (discussing prior disposition of employee's Title I claim), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871
(1998); Lewis v. AetnaLife Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1160-63 (E.D. Va. 1997) (considering
employee's standing under Title I); Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank, 967 F. Supp. 802,80304 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing employee's Title I claim); Pappas v. BethesdaHosp. Ass'n, 861
F. Supp. 616, 617 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (same).
17. See ADA § 102(a), 42U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (prohibiting employerfrom discriminating against qualified individual with disability regarding "terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment"). Title I prohibits an employer from subjecting an individual to different terms
or conditions of insurance based on disability alone, if the disability does not impose increased
risks. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITYCOMMISSiON, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCEMANUAL
§ 7.9 (Jan. 26, 1992), reprinted in AMERICANS WITH DISABILrnEs ACT MANUAL (BNA)
90:0565-66 (stating that Title I prohibition against discrimination applies to provision and
administration of health insurance and other benefit plans).
18. SeeParker,121 F.3d at 1010-14(considering employee'sTitle III claimagainstinsurance company); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 1820(1st Cir. 1994) (considering employee's Title III claim against insurer); Lewis, 982 F. Supp.
at 1163-65 (considering employee's standing to sue insurance company under Title III);
LeonardF.,967 F. Supp. at 805-06 (considering employee's Title III claim against insurance
company); Pappas,861 F. Supp. at 619-20 (same).
19. Bonnie Milstein et al., TheAmericans with DisabilitiesAct:A BreathtakingPromise
for Peoplewith MentalDisabilities,24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1240, 1245 (1991); see Paul V.
Sullivan, Note, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990: An Analysis of Title III and
Applicable Case Law, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1117, 1125 (1995) (noting extremely broad
purview of Title III).
20. See ADA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of
disability "by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation").
21.
See infra notes 168-85 and accompanying text (demonstrating that insurance office
is place of public accommodation and that Title III equates insurance company with person
operating insurance office).
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A determination of whether Americans with disabilities have a cause of
action under Title I against insurance companies on the basis ofthe discriminatory terms of employer-provided insurance plans requires a two-part inquiry. First, Title HI must be broad enough to authorize an employee's claim
challenging the substantial terms of a policy issued by the insurance company.' Unless Title m authorizes the suit, the potential plaintiff with a disability has no cause ofaction against the insurance company and must proceed
solely against the employer.' Second, Section 501(c) of the ADA24 must not
provide immunity for the actions of the insurance companyt Section 501(c)
protects the insurance industry's current practice of providing insurance based
on state-regulated risk classification schemes.2 6 Section 501(c) appears,
however, to limit its own scope. It protects insurance companies only when
they use risk classification schemes that do not violate state law 8 and do not
22. See Tucker, supra note 3, at 940 (stating that to determine liability of private insurance carrier, it is first necessary to address "the threshold issue of when an insurer falls within
the coverage of Title IR").
23. See ADA §§ 101-108, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994) (providing for cause of
action against employer and not insurance company under Title I).
24. ADA § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
25. See Monica E. McFadden, InsuranceBenefits Under the ADA: Discriminationor
Business as Usual?, 28 TORT & INS. L.J. 480, 481 (1993) (stating that Section 501(c) raises
question about whether ADA shields insurance companies from all liability).
26. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 84-85 (1989) (discussing intent of Section 501(c)).
Section 501(c) states:
Subchapters Ithrough IH of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict(1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance
organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar
organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based
on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based
on or not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) aperson or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not
subject to State laws that regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes
of subchapter[s] I and Imof this chapter.
ADA § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). See infra notes 62-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the general principles of risk classification.
27. See ADA § 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (limiting scope of protections to when
insurance company uses risk classification schemes consistent with state law and does not use
such classification schemes as subterfuge to violate ADA).
28. See id. (stating that Section 501(c) protects insurers that administer risks based on or
not inconsistent with state law).
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otherwise evade the purposes of Title Ill.29 Courts recognize that Section
501(c) does not provide absolute immunity to insurance companies." The
exact scope of the protection offered insurers under Section 501(c) has,
however, yet to be determined and is beyond the scope of this Note. This
Note focuses on the issue that courts largely have ignored: Does Title III
authorize plaintiffs to sue insurance companies when the terms of their
employer-provided insurance plans discriminate on the basis of a disability?
Two federal courts of appeals have considered whether Title III provides
an employee with a disability a cause of action against an insurance company
based on the discriminatory terms ofan employer-provided insurance policy.31
The two cases provide diametrically opposed answers32 and inadequate anal29. See id. (stating that "[p]aragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge
to evade the purposes of subchapter[s] I and III of this chapter").
30. See, e.g., Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., No. CIV. 3-96-75 MJDIAJB, 1998 WL
852876, at *6 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 1998) (recognizing that if Title III did not apply to insurance
policies, Section 501(c) would be superfluous); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp.
299, 302-03 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that "Congress did not intend for § 501(c) to confer
blanket immunity on insurers in every insurance-related decision" and that "[tihe plain text of
§ 501(c) leaves insurance companies vulnerable in two ways"); Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 430-31 (D.N.H. 1996) (stating that insurance practice consistent with
state law may still be subterfuge to evade purposes ofADA and therefore not receive protections
of Section 501(c)); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1323 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (concluding that Section 501(c) does not prevent Title III claim); Bakerv. Hartford Life
Ins. Co., No. 94-C-4416, 1995 WL 573430, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995) (recognizing
possibility "that the decision to deny plaintiff coverage was not based on considerations of
underwriting or classifying risks, in which case plaintiff might be entitled to recover under the
ADA"). But see Leonard F. v. Israel Discount Bank, 967 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating that plain meaning and legislative history of Section 501(c) support conclusion that
Congress did not intend Title III to regulate business of private insurance carriers).
31.
See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010-14 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (considering employee's Title III claim against insurance company), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 871 (1998); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12,
18-20 (lst Cir. 1994) (same). This Note focuses on the analysis provided by the First and Sixth
Circuits. It is importantto note, however, that in 1998 the Court ofAppeals for the Third Circuit
rejected an employee's Title III claim against an insurance company based on a disparity in the
benefits for mental and physical disabilities provided in an employer-provided insurance plan.
See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 603 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing issue presented upon appeal), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999). In concluding that the employee did
not have a cause of action against the insurance company based on Title III, the Third Circuit
aligned itself with the analysis provided by the Sixth Circuit in Parkerv. Metropolitan Life
InsuranceCo. Id. at 613-14 (stating that "by aligning ourselves with the Sixth Circuit's Parker
decision regarding the definition of 'public accommodation[,]' we part company with the First
Circuit in this regard"). See infra notes 130 and 151 for a discussion of specific instances in the
Fordcase in which the Third Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Parker.
32. See Employer-ProvidedDisability Insurance Isn't Public Accommodation Under
ADA, 66 U.S.L.W. 1085, 1085 (Aug. 12, 1997) (noting split between First and Sixth Circuits
over scope of Title III).
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yses 3 In CarpartsDistribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's
Ass'n," the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined
that the broad language and the intent of Title II3 suggested that a plaintiff
could directly sue an insurance company based on the discriminatory,
disability-based health coverage of an employer-provided insurance plan."
In Parkerv. MetropolitanLife Insurance Co.,3" however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit interpreted Title I narrowly38 and
33. See infra Part V (discussing inadequacies of First and Sixth Circuit opinions).
34. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994).
35. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir.
1994) (arguing that "public accommodations" do not require physical structures); see infraPart
IV.B (providing First Circuit's Title III analysis). In Carparts,the First Circuit considered
whether Ronald Senter and his employer, Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. (Carparts), had a
valid Title III claim against Automotive Wholesaler's Association of New England, Inc.
(AWANE), the provider of the self-funded medical reimbursement plan of which Carparts was
a member, and AWANE's administering trust, Automotive Wholesaler's ofNew England, Inc.
Insurance Plan (AWANE Plan). Carparts,37 F.3d at 14-15. Senter contracted HIV in 1986
and AIDS in 1991. Id. at 14. When the AWANE Trust limited benefits for AIDS-related
illnesses, Senter and Carparts sued both AWANE and AWANE Plan alleging that the-cap on
benefitsviolatedtheADA. Id TheFirstCircuit, looking atthe language and legislativehistory
of Title III, concluded that "public accommodations" need not consist of physical structures.
Id. at 19. The court stated that a contrary conclusion would conflict with the purposes of the
ADA and of Title III. Id. However, the court recognized that Title III's ambiguous language
makes the statute difficult to interpret Id The court could not determine from the text and
supporting legislative material whether Congress intended Title III to shape and control the
products and services that a place of public accommodation offers. Id The court also noted
the ambiguity of the ADA's treatment of insurance in Section 501(c). Id. at 20. Because of the
ambiguities involved in the Title III issue, the court remanded the case on the plaintiffs' Title
I claim instead and declined to provide further guidance on the Title III issue beyond merely
suggesting that a Title III claim might be possible. Id.
36. See Carparts,37 F.3d at 20 (suggesting "possibilitythat the plaintiff may be able to
develop some kind of claim under Title I1").
37.
121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
38. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1012 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (arguing that Title III does not govern contents of employer-provided insurance plan and
that employer-provided plan is not good or service of place of public accommodation), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct 871 (1998); see also infra Part IV.C (providing Sixth Circuit's analysis of
Title I1). In Parker, the Sixth Circuit considered whether Title III prohibits an insurance
company from issuing an employer-provided insurance plan that contains longer benefits for
employees with physical disabilities than for employees with mental disabilities. Parker,121
F.3dat 1008. Schering-PloughHealth CareProducts(Schering-Plough) employedtheplaintiff,
Ouida Sue Parker, and offered her a long-term disability plan issued by Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. (MetLife). Id. Parker became disabled because of severe depression, and 24
months after she began to receive disability benefits, Schering-Plough terminated the payments
pursuant to the terms of the insurance plan. Id. The court, relying upon the language of Title
III, determined that although Title III expressly states that an insurance office is a public
accommodation, Parker did not seek a good from an insurance office. Id. at 1010. The court
stated that an employer-provided benefit plan is not a good from a place ofpublic accommoda-
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concluded that Title III does not provide potential plaintiffs a direct cause of
action against an insurance company. 9 Neither court provided satisfactory
guidance for potential plaintiffs, potential defendants, or district courts.
This Note examines whether Title HI provides Americans with disabilities
a cause of action against insurance companies on the basis of the discriminatory terms of employer-provided insurance plans. Part II provides an overview
of the insurance system, including the principles of risk classification that tend
to discriminate against employees with disabilities.4" Part I discusses the
background and language of Title III.41 Part IV presents a critical analysis of
the scope of Title III protections as it currently exists under case law.42 Part
IV.A focuses the Title Ill inquiry within the employer-provided insurance
context, 4 3 and Parts IV.B and IV.C present the competing analyses of the
Carpartsand Parkercourts, respectively, within that context.' Part V critiques the Carpartsand Parkerdecisions, explores their omissions, and concludes that Title III is broad enough to subject insurance companies to liability
based on discrimination in the terms of employer-provided insurance plans.4"
I

The Nature of Insurance

Insurance protects against significant and unpredictable financial loss
stemming from defined adverse events.46 Insurance companies provide such
tion. Id Based on the Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations, the court also determined that
Title III regulates the availability of the goods and services offered by a place of public accommodation as opposed to the contents of those goods and services. Id. at 1011-12. In addition
to Title III, the court also considered whether the ADA prohibits only discrimination between
the disabled and the nondisabled as opposed to discrimination between individuals with different disabilities. Id at 1015-19. The court decided that the ADA does not require equality
between individuals with different disabilities. Id. at 1019. The court concluded that the
provision of an employer-provided long-term disability plan that an insurance company
administers does not fall within the purview of Title III. Id. at 1015.
39. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014 (stating that "provision of a long-term disability plan
by an employer and administered by an insurance company does not fall within the purview of
Title III").
40. See infranotes 46-70 and accompanying text (discussing nature of insurance indus-

try).
41.
See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text (presenting provisions of Title III).
42. See infra notes 83-158 and accompanying text (discussing Title III inquiry).
43. See infranotes 83-95 and accompanying text (presenting four factors that courts must
consider in order to determine appropriate scope of Title III protections within context of
employer-provided insurance plans).
44. See infranotes 96-158 and accompanying text (describing Title III analyses of Carparts and Parkercourts).
45. See infra notes 159-320 and accompanying text (concluding that scope of Title III is
broad enough to subject insurance company to liability).
46. See COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE,
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protection pursuant to written contracts in return for advance payments. 47 An
employer typically contracts with an insurance company to provide insurance
to its employees. 8 The employer holds the policy and assumes partial or full
responsibility for the premium payments.49 As a third party beneficiary, however, the employee is a de facto party to the contract or is at least sufficiently
interested in the contract to require the employer and the insurance company
to consider the employee's interests."
Employer-provided health and disability insurance plans are critical to
individuals with disabilities,5 yet these plans often exclude or limit coverage
for certain conditions or ailments that affect these individuals.52 Adequate
health insurance is often the key to full participation in society for many
individuals with disabilities.53 Nonetheless, these individuals cannot always
secure adequate health insurance coverage. The recent national health insurance debate reveals a terrible shortage of employer-provided health insurance
available to individuals with disabilities.55 This shortage causes great concern
EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTHBENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK 43 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold
T. Shapiro eds., 1993) (defining insurance); Lizzette Palmer, Comment, ERISA Preemptionand
Its Effects on Cappingthe HealthBenefits ofIndividualswith AIDS: A Demonstrationof Why
the UnitedStatesHealthandInsuranceSystemsRequireSubstantialReform,30 HOUS. L. REV.
1347, 1353 (1993) (describing insurance).
47. See COMMn'rEEONEMPLOYER-BASEDHEALTHBENEF1TS, supranote 46, at43 (defining insurance).
48. See 1 LEE R_Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 7:1 (3d ed. 1997) (explaining nature of
group insurance).
49. See l id. (explaining nature of group insurance).
50. See 1 id (discussing third party beneficiary's unique position under group insurance
contracts).
51. See supranote 2 and accompanying text (discussing why insurance coverage is critical to disabled individuals).
52. See supranotes 5-7 and accompanying text (discussing discriminatory nature of employer-provided health and disability insurance policies).
53. See World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (noting that
access to adequate health care is important to disabled individual's ability to participate in
society), aff'dinpart,vacatedinpart, 156 F.3d 1142 (1 Ith Cir. 1998); Doukas v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422,427 (D.N.H. 1996) (stating that "it is often insurance coverage
that will determine a disabled person's ability to prevent the disability from limiting his or her
participation in society" (quoting Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 192-93 (6th
Cir.), reh'g en banc grantedand vacated, 107 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1996), reh'g en banc, 121
F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998))); Ackourey, supra note 2, at
1216 (stating that prohibition of discrimination in insurance coverage is crucial to ability of
disabled individuals to become independent citizens).
54. See Milstein etal., supranote 19, at 1243 (discussing difficulties thathealth insurance
introduces to individuals with disabilities); John W. Parry, MentalDisabilitiesUnderthe ADA:
A DifficultPathto Follow, 17 MENTAL&PHYsICALDIsABiLrrYL.REP. 100, 108 (1993) (stating
that insurers limit employees' health coverage for mental disability treatment).
55. See MariaO'BrienHylton, InsuranceRiskClassiflcationsAferMcGann:Managing
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because ofthe importance ofhealth insurance for people seeking quality health
care for themselves and for their families 6 and because of the dependence of
most Americans on employer-provided plans for their health insurance.57

Long-term disability insurance is also significant to individuals with
disabilities." Disability benefits provide wage replacements to employees
who are absent from work because of injury or illness. 9 Employees typically
receive long-term disability insurance when they are absent from work for a
certain amount of time.6" Some employers limit the long-term disability
insurance available for individuals with certain disabilities. 6
The discriminatory terms of employer-provided insurance plans are due
in part to the nature of the insurance system.62 The insurance industry writes
policies based on principles of actuarial fairness63 and risk classification."
Actuarial fairness principles suggest that insurers link the cost of and access
to insurance coverage to an individual's risk class.65 For example, younger
people pay more for car insurance because statistically, they have more
accidents.66
Risk Efficiently in the Shadow of the ADA, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 59, 59 (1995) (stating that
significant part of health insurance debate during first two years of President Clinton's administration focused on critical shortage of employer-provided health insurance for disabled
individuals).
56. See Ackourey, supra note 2, at 1186 (stating that health coverage is necessity for
people wishing to provide themselves and their family with adequate health care).
57. See Koslow & White, supra note 3, at 560 (discussing Americans' dependence on
employer-sponsored health coverage to provide for their own and their families' health care);
see also Steven Eisenstat, Capping Health Insurance Benefits for AIDS. An Analysis of
Disability-BasedDistinctions Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 10 J.L. & POL. 1,2
(1993) (suggesting that three out of four American workers rely upon health insurance that
employer provides); Palmer, supra note 46, at 1353 (stating that Americans "who have health
insurance typically obtain coverage through an employer-sponsored plan").
58. See PENSION & WELFARE BENEFrrS ADMIN., supranote 3, at 230 (discussing longterm disability insurance).
59. Id at 225.
60. Id. at 230.
61. See id at 231 (stating that some companies restrict long-term disability benefits for
individuals with mental disabilities).
62. See Storer, supra note 4, at 1048-49 (suggesting that different terms or conditions of
insurance plans may be "legal discrimination" if"based upon risk classification made in conformity with non-discriminatory requirements").
63. See COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 46, at 180
(stating that conventional insurance theory follows principle of actuarial fairness).
64. See Ackourey, supra note 2, at 1212 (stating that "[t]he basis of the insurance industry. .. involves assessing risks according to the classification of individuals with particular
risks").
65. CoMMITTEE ON EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 46, at 180.
66. See id. (providing examples of actuarial fairness).
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Risk classification is an actuarial technique for estimating an individual's
future claim costs based on risk characteristics of the individual, such as the
presence of a disability, that have a direct causal or statistical link to the risk
that the insurance company is measuring, such as disability income or medical
expenses.67 When an insurance company provides insurance to an individual,
the company classifies the person according to various characteristics and
then charges a rate accordingly.6" The insurer may also limit the amount of
insurance coverage that a policy provides to an individual. 69 Employerprovided insurance plans usually do not vary the degree of coverage that
a policy provides to individual members of the plans based on individual
risk classification. Instead, employers subscribe to group plans that tend to
impose blanket limitations that affect all employees that display the same
characteristics."
III. Title X of the Americans with DisabilitiesAct
Section 302(a) of Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public
accommodations. 71 The section provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases
to), or operates aplace of public accommodation."' Title III defines a "public
accommodation" as a private entity whose operations affect commerce. 73
The plain statutory language of Title HI indicates that an insurance office
is a place of public accommodation.74 An insurance company typically owns,
67. See H. Miriam Farber, Subterfuge: Do Coverage Limitations and Exclusions in
Employer-ProvidedHealthCarePlansViolatethe Americanswith DisabilitiesAct?,69N.Y.U.

L. REv. 850, 866 (1994) (describing risk classification as actuarial technique for estimating
future claims costs based on risk classifications linked to specific risk that insurer is measuring).
68.

See Ackourey, supranote2,at 1212(describing risk classification); Storer, supranote

4, at 1034 (stating that insurers charge higher rates for higher risks and lower rates for lower
risks).
69. See Ackourey, supra note 2, at 1212 (describing risk classification).
70. See Farber, supra note 67, at 866-67 (discussing risk classification used in employerprovided plans).
71. See ADA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination by "any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation").

72.

Ide

73. See ADA § 301(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (listing private entities that are public accommodations for purposes of Title III if operations of such entities affect commerce).

74.

See id.(including insurance office in list of private entities that are public accommo-

dations for purposes of Title III); infra notes 168-85 and accompanying text (explaining that
establishments listed in Section 301(7), including insurance offices, are actually places ofpublic
accommodation as opposed to public accommodations themselves).
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leases, or operates an insurance office.7' Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether an insurance company is subject to liability under Title III, the
appropriate question is whether the insurance company that owns, leases, or
operates the insurance office "discriminated against [an employee] on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of" the goods or services
of the insurance office.76
The provisions of Section 302(b)(1) of the ADA assist in answering this
question.77 Section 302(b)(1) describes the general forms of discrimination
that Section 302(a) prohibits.78 Three general forms of discrimination are

relevant within the insurance context. First, a public accommodation may not
deny an individual with a disability the opportunity to participate in or benefit
from the goods or services of a place of public accommodation.79 Second, a

public accommodation may not provide an individual with a disability an
opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good or service that is not equal
to the opportunity provided to other individuals." Finally, a public accommo-

dation may not provide an individual with a disability a good or service that
is different or separate from that provided to other individuals.8 ' Title I

75. SeeBakerv. HartfordLifelns. Co.,No. 94-C-4416,1995 WL573430, at*3 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 28, 1995) (noting that defendant Hartford Life Insurance Company owned, leased, or
operated insurance office from which company denied plaintiffinsurance based on his disability).
76. See ADA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (providing general prohibition of discrimination by public accommodations).
77. See ADA § 302(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1) (1994) (providing general forms of
discrimination that Section 302(a) prohibits).
78. See id. (describing general forms of discrimination that Title III prohibits); S. REP.
No. 101-116, at 60 (1989) (stating that Section 302(b)(1) of ADA specifies general forms of
discrimination prohibited by Title III).
79. ADA§ 302(b)(1)(A)(i),42U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). Section302(b)(1)(A)(i) states:
It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individuals on the
basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the
individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity.
Id.
80. ADA § 302(b)(1)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). Section 302(b)(1)(A)(ii)
states:
It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the
basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with the opportunity to participate in
or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation
that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals.
Id
81. ADA § 302(b)(1)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 302(b)(1)(A)(iii)
states:
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prohibits these forms of discrimination regardless of whether the public
accommodation directly discriminates or does so indirectly through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements. 2
IV. The Title IIIInquiry
A. The FourFactorAnalysis
Discrimination in the terms of employer-provided insurance plans is
subtle and is therefore difficult to identify and to examine under Title I. 3.
It differs from the traditional claim of overt discrimination involving a denial
of physical access," such as when a store owner refuses to allow a blind
individual to enter into the store 5 or when a store is inaccessible by wheelchair. Because of this difference, the determination of whether an employee
can maintain a cause of action against an insurance company demands a more
thorough analysis of the scope of Title IT than courts typically engage in when
considering a claim of overt discrimination.86
Four factors are relevant to the determination of whether Title III provides employees with a cause of action against insurance companies on the
basis ofthe discriminatory terms of employer-provided insurance plans. First,
It shall be discriminatory to provide an individual or class of individuals, on the
basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through
contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is different or separate from that provided
to other individuals, unless such action is necessary to provide the individual or
class of individuals with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that provided to others.
Id
82. See ADA §§ 302(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (discussing
general forms of discrimination that violate Title III); Milstein et al., supra note 19, at 1246
(stating that prohibitions against general forms of discrimination apply "whetherthe discrimination results from a direct action by the private entity or from its contractual, licensing, or other
arrangements with outside establishments").
83. See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 19-20
(Ist Cir. 1994) (considering ambiguities of Title III that led court merely to suggest possibility
that plaintiffs could sue insurance company under Title III).
84. See Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that
plaintiff had to show denial of physical access to ice rink to have successful Title III claim);
Pappas v. BethesdaHosp. Ass'n, 861 F. Supp. 616, 620 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that Congress
limited scope of Title III discrimination to disabled person's inability to make physical use of
services of place of public accommodation).
85. SeeS.REP.No. 101-116, at62 (1989) (explainingthatpublicaccommodationviolates
Title III by refusing to allow blind people into grocery store or refusing to serve deaf people at
drugstore).
86. See ADA § 302(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v), 42U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v) (1994) (providing plain language prohibiting barriers to physical access that courts cart easily analyze).
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courts must determine whether Title III is limited to protecting physical access
into places of public accommodation. 7 When an employee sues an insurance
company under Title III, the employee alleges discrimination in the terms of
the insurance policy, not a denial of physical access to the insurance office."8
If Title III protects only physical access, an employee does not have a cause

of action against an insurance company.
Second, courts need to consider whether a plaintiff must be physically
present inside a place of public accommodation to be entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment.8 9 An employee is not physically present in the insurance
office when the employee obtains an employer-provided plan.' If Title Ill
87. CompareWorldIns. Co. v. Branch, 966F. Supp. 1203,1207 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (stating
that scope of Title III extends beyond mere prohibition of denial of physical access to place of
public accommodation), affdinpart,vacatedinpart,156 F.3d 1142 (1 th Cir. 1998), Cloutier
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that to interpret Title III
as prohibiting only physical barriers to access to public accommodations is inconsistent with
language of Title III), Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422,425-26 (D.N.H.
1996) (suggesting that Title III does not merely prohibit public accommodations from denying
physical access), Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316,1321 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
(stating that Title III does not bar only discrimination in access to physical structures), and
Tucker, supranote 3, at 942 (stating that Title III extends beyond mere access to facilities), with
Elitt, 922 F. Supp. at 223 (determining that plaintiff had to show denial of physical access to
ice rink as place of public accommodation to have successful Title III claim), andPappas,861
F. Supp. at 620 (stating that Congress limited scope of Title III to protect only disabled person's
inability to make physical use of services of place of public accommodation).
88. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
bane) (considering liability of insurance company for issuing disability plan containing longer
benefits for employees with physical disabilities than for employees with mental disabilities),
cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 871 (1998); Carparts,37 F.3d at 14 (considering plaintiffs' allegations
concerning lifetime cap on health benefits for employees with AIDS); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1159-60 (E.D. Va. 1997) (considering discrepancy between employerprovided disability benefits that insurer offers to employees with physical disabilities as
compared to benefits that insurer offers to employees with mental disabilities).
89. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011 n.3 (failing to resolve issue of whether discrimination
must occur while plaintiff is physically present inside place of public accommodation); Lewis,
982 F. Supp. at 1163-64 (considering whether Title III protections extend to goods purchased
while plaintiff was not physically present inside place of public accommodation); Doukas v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422,425 (D.N.H. 1996) (noting that court in Carparts
stated that Congress intended to protect those individuals purchasing services over telephone
or by mail as support for conclusion that Title III does not protect only denial of goods or
services that occurs when plaintiff is physically present (citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v.
Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994))); Baker v. Hartford Life Ins.
Co., No. 94-C-4416, 1995 WL 573430, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995) (stating that plaintiff
need not be physically present at place of public accommodation for Title III to ensure nondiscriminatory treatment).
90. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011 (noting that employee did not physically access
insurance policy from insurance office); Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1163-64 (discussing defendant's
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requires physical presence and face-to-face contact, an employee cannot sue
an insurance company for discrimination in the terms ofan employer-provided
insurance plan.
Third, courts must ascertain whether Title III governs the contents of the
goods and services that public accommodations offer.9 In making a Title III
claim based on the discriminatory terms of an employer-provided insurance
plan, an employee alleges discrimination in the contents of the policy as
opposed to discrimination in the access to the nominal coverage provided by
the insurance company.' Therefore, unless an employee alleges a complete
denial of insurance, the employee cannot sue the insurance company if Title
IIl does not govern the contents of goods and services.
Finally, courts must consider the relationship between the employee and
the insurance company. An employee obtains an employer-provided insurance plan through the employer rather than directly from the insurance company.94 If Title III only governs discrimination that a public accommodation
inflicts directly upon individuals, an employee does not have a cause of action
against the insurance company.
Each of these four factors is critical to a thorough interpretation of the
application of Title I to employer-provided insurance. The only two federal
courts of appeals to consider the issue, however, each failed to fully address
all four factors.95 Thus, neither court adequately analyzed the Title III inquiry.
argument based on fact that employee did not physically enter insurance office to obtain
insurance policy).
91. See CarpartsDistrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler'sAss'n, 37F.3d 12,19(1st
Cir. 1994) (stating that Title III's language is ambiguous concerning whether Congress intended
Title III to shape contents of goods or services offered). CompareParker, 121 F.3d at 1012
(stating that Title III does not govern contents of insurance plan), and Ronald S. Cooper, The
Treatment ofEmployee Benefit ProgramsUnderthe Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990,
17J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 37,46 (1991) (demonstrating that Title III does not apply
to product design), with Doukas, 950 F. Supp. at 425-26 (stating that Title III extends to
contents of insurance policies), and Storer, supranote 4, at 1036 (stating that Title III governs
terms of private insurance contracts).
92. See Parker,121 F.3d at 1012 (finding itnecessaryto address whetherTitleIII governs
contents of insurance plan because of plaintiff's claim of discrimination in terms of policy);
Doukas, 950 F. Supp. at 425 (same).
93. Compare Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010 (arguing that because plaintiff accessed plan
provided by employer, plaintiff did not seek good or service of insurance office) with Lewis, 982
F. Supp. at 1165 (concluding that Title III prohibits insurer from discriminating regardless of
whether insurer sells policy directly to individual or sells indirectly to employee through
contractual arrangement with employer).
94. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing nature of employer-provided insurance).
95. See infra notes 96-158 and accompanying text (discussing Title III analysis of Carparts and Parkercourts).
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B. The FirstCircuit'sInconclusive Analysis
In CarpartsDistributionCenter,Inc. v. Automotive Wholes.aler'sAss 'n,
the First Circuit considered whether an employee and his employer had causes
of action under Titles I and III against the insurance company that provided
health insurance to Carparts's employees.96 Carparts participated in amedical
reimbursement plan, the Automotive Wholesalers Association of New England Health Benefit Plan (Plan).97 Automotive Wholesalers Association of
New England, Inc. (AWANE) and its administering trust, Automotive Wholesalers Association of New England, Inc. Insurance Plan (AWANE Plan)
offered the Plan to Carparts.98 Ronald Senter, an employee of Carparts, was
the sole shareholder, president, and chief executive director of Carparts. 9 He
contracted HIV in 1986, which developed into AIDS in 1991.1" In 1990,
AWANE informed Carparts that it would amend the plan to limit benefits for
AIDS-related illnesses to $25,000.0 °
Carparts and Senter sued AWANE and AWANEPlan under two theories.
First, they alleged that the lifetime cap on benefits for individuals with AIDS
constituted illegal discrimination on the basis of a disability in violation of
Title III°2 Second, Carparts and Senter alleged that AWANE and AWANE
Plan were employers for the purposes of Title I and therefore violated Title I
by discriminating in the terms of the insurance plan. 3 The district court
dismissed plaintiffs' Title I and Title III claims, and the plaintiffs appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit."° On appeal, the
plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the district court erred in determining that a
public accommodation must be an actual physical structure, which the defendants did not possess."°5
1. The Meaning of "PublicAccommodations"
In considering the appeal from the district court's dismissal, the Carparts
court determined the meaning of "public accommodations" by analyzing
96.

CarpartsDistrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler'sAss'n,37F.3d 12, 14(lstCir.

1994).
97.
98.

Id.
Id.

99.

Id

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 14-15.
Id.at 15-16.
Id.at 15.
Id.at 18.
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Section 301(7) of the ADA."° Section 301(7) lists private entities that are
public accommodations for the purposes of Title I if the operations of those
entities affect commerce. 0 7 As the Carpartscourt stated, the list "includes a
'travel service,' a 'shoe repair service,' an 'office of an accountant, or lawyer,' an 'insurance office,' a 'professional office ofahealthcare provider,' and
'other service establishment[s]."" 8 The court determined that the plain
meaning of these terms indicates that Title III does not require public accommodations to have physical structures." ° The conclusion that Title I extends
beyond merely protecting physical access into physical structures necessarily
follows from this determination. 10
If the establishments listed in Section 301(7) need not have physical
structures, it would be illogical to require a plaintiff to be physically present
inside aphysical structureto be entitled to nondiscriminatorytreatment."1 The
Carpartscourt, although still addressing whether public accommodations are
physical places, provided direct support for the argument that a plaintiff need
not be physically present to have a cause of action under Title 11I.11 Because
many service establishments, such as travel services, conductbusiness without
requiring a person to enter a physical structure to obtain the services, the court
concluded that Congress contemplated that service establishments include
providers ofservices that do not require individuals to enter an office to receive
services." 3 The court stated that Congress could not have intended for the
ADAto protectthose who enter an office to receive services, butnotthosewho
purchase the same services by telephone or through correspondence." 4
2. The FirstCircuitFailsto Resolve Title III Claim
Although the court was confident in its conclusion that public accommodations need not have physical structures, the court did not have sufficient
107.

Id. at 19.
See ADA § 301(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994) (defining public accommodation).

108.

Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12,19 (lst Cir.

106.

1994) (quoting ADA § 301(7)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F)).
109.
110.

Id.
See supranotes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing factor concerning whether

Title III merely protects physical access into physical structures).
111. See supranotes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing factor addressing whether
plaintiff must be physically inside place of public accommodation for Title IIIto ensure
nondiscriminatory treatment).
112. See Carparts,37 F.3d at 19 (stating that it would be irrational for Congress to have
intended to protectpersons who enter an officeto purchase goods but not persons who purchase
those goods through correspondence or by telephone).

113.

Id

114. Id
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knowledge of the facts of the case to determine whether the plaintiffs had
a valid Title III claim. 15 The court recognized that the determination of
the validity of the Title III claim would require a careful consideration of
the language of Title III.16 The court, however, found the bare language
and legislative history of Title III unclear, particularly concerning whether
Congress intended to provide only access to products and services or whether
Congress intended also to shape and to control the contents of the products
and services that a place of public accommodation offers." 7 Because the
court remanded the case on the Title I issue and determined that the facts
before it were insufficient, the court chose not to resolve the ambiguity, but
instead allowed the district court to ascertain the appropriate scope of Title III
on remand."' Thus, the court failed to determine whether Title mI1 governs
the contents of goods and services" 9 and chose to limit its Title III conclusion
to the possibility that Senter and Carparts might develop a Title III claim
against AWANE. 20

C. The Sixth CircuitNarrowsthe Scope of Title III
In Parkerv. MetropolitanLife InsuranceCo., the Sixth Circuit considered whether an employee had a valid cause of action under Title III of the
ADA againstthe insurance companythat issued an employer-provided disabil115. See id.at 20 (stating that "[w]hile it is tempting to seek to provide further guidance
[on the Title III issue], the nature of the record and the way the issues are addressed in the
appellate briefs make it imprudent to do so").
116. See id. at 19 (stating that "[b]eyond our threshold determination, we must tread with
care").
117. Id.
118. See id. at 21 (vacating district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' ADA claims). On
remand, the district court accepted the First Circuit's conclusion that a public accommodation
need not be a physical structure and thus considered whether defendants were public accommodations. Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 987 F. Supp. 77, 81
(D.N.H. 1997). Defendants asserted that they were not public accommodations and were
therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law with regard to plaintiffs' Title III claims. Id.
After considering defendants' arguments, the district court concluded that defendants failed to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they were public
accommodations under Title III. Id.
119. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing third factor that concerns
whether Title III governs only access to, as opposed to contents of, goods and services of place
of public accommodation). The court failed to mention the fourth factor that concerns the relationship between the employee and the insurance company issuing the employer-provided
insurance plan.
120. See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37F.3d 12,20 (1st
Cir. 1994) (stating that "at this stage it is unwise to go beyond thepossibilitythat the plaintiff
may be able to develop some kind of claim under Title II").
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ity plan.'
Schering-Plough Health Care Products (Schering-Plough) employed the plaintiff, Ouida Sue Parker, and offered her a long-term disability
plan that Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) issued.'2 Parker
became disabled because of severe depression, and twenty-four months after
she began to receive payments, Schering-Plough terminated her payments
pursuant to the terms of the plan." Parker sued MetLife, alleging that the
discrepancy between the length of benefits provided to individuals with
physical disabilities and the length of benefits provided to individuals with
mental disabilities constituted a violation of Title III.24 The district court
dismissed Parker's Title III claim based upon the conclusion that Title I does
not govern discrimination in the terms of insurance policies."2 Parker appealed, and a panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal
of the Title I claim.'26 Following the reversal, the defendant sought rehearing en banc.2 The Sixth Circuit, hearing the case en banc, vacated its prior
judgment and agreed with the district court's dismissal of the Title III claim.'
Then, the plaintiff appealed, bringing the case before the Sixth Circuit sitting
en banc for a second time.129
1. PublicAccommodation Is a PhysicalPlace
Hearing the case en banc for the second time, the Sixth Circuit disagreed
with the First Circuit's conclusion that a public accommodation need not be
a physical place. 30 Applying the principle of noscitura sociis,'' the Parker
121.
Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1008(6th Cir. 1997) (en banc),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.(presenting Parker's claims).
125. Id
126. Id at 1009.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id
130. Id at 1013-14; see supraPart IV.B.1 (providing First Circuit's analysis of meaning
of"public accommodations"). In Fordv. Schering-PloughCorp., the Third Circuit also disagreed with the First Circuit's definition of"public accommodation" and aligned itself with the
Sixth Circuit's conclusion that a "public accommodation" is a place. See Ford v. ScheringPlough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613-14 (3d Cir. 1998) (aligning itself with Sixth Circuit's
definition of "public accommodation" and explaining its disagreement with First Circuit's
conclusion that public accommodation need not be place), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999).
131.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1060(6th ed. 1990) (explaining that under doctrine
of noscitura sociis, "the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may
be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it").
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court determined that the public accommodations that Section 301(7) lists are
The court noted that every term in Section 301(7) is a
physical places.'
physical place open to public access.' Although subsection F lists establishments such as a "travel service," a "shoe repair service," an "office of an
accountant or lawyer," an "insurance office," and any "other service establishment," the court stated that Congress used the term "service" throughout the
list because it did not have a better term to describe the offices where entities
provide their services. 134 The court stated that placing the terms "office of an
accountant or lawyer," "insurance office," and "professional office of a
healthcare provider" in the context of the other terms in subsection F suggests
only a physical place where entities offer their services.135 The Sixth Circuit
concluded that interpreting such terms as permitting a public accommodation
to be something other than a physical place is contrary to the principle of
noscitur a sociis.'36
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Carpartscourt's conclusion that
public accommodations need not have physical structures. 37 The Sixth Circuit's analysis therefore did not address two factors-whether Title Im protects
only physical access into places of public accommodation and whether a
plaintiffmust be physically present at the place ofpublic accommodation to be
entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment-that the Carpartscourt addressed in
defining "public accommodation."' In determiningthata public accommodation must be a physical place, the Parkercourt left open the possibility that
Title III protects only physical access.' 39 In contrast to the First Circuit's
conclusion in Carparts,the Parkercourt's analysis does not necessarily lead
to the determinationthat aplaintiffneed notbe physically present inside a place
of public accommodation to be entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment. 4
132. Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 1013 (expressing disagreement with Carpartscourt).
138. See supranotes 110-14 and accompanying text (discussing Carpartscourt's analysis
of first two factors inherent in court's definition of "public accommodation").
139. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing first factor-whether Title
HI prohibits only denial of physical access-that courts must address in determining if Title III
cause of action exists).
140. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussing second factor - whether
plaintiff must be physically present inside place ofpublic accommodation for Title III to ensure
nondiscriminatory treatment of plaintiff- that courts must address in determining if Title III
cause of action exists).
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Thus, contrary to Carparts,141 Parkerdid not inherently provide guidance on

the first two
factors that courts must consider in determining a plaintiff's Title
1 42
III claim.
2. The Sixth CircuitRejects Title III Claim
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment that the district court
entered against Parker's Title III claim.143 In reaching this decision, the court
stated that Title III regulates only the availability of the goods and services
that a place of public accommodation offers as opposed to the contents of
those goods and services.' 44 Quoting Department of Justice (DOJ) regulations, the court stated that the purpose of Title III "is to ensure accessibility
to the goods offered by a public accommodation, not to alter the nature or mix
of goods that the public accommodation has typically provided."1 45 The court
concluded that Title III does not apply to the contents of a long-term disability
6
4

plan.1

Although recognizing that an insurance office is a public accommodation
under Title III, the Sixth Circuit determined that an employer-provided
insurance plan is not a good that a place of public accommodation offers. 47
The Parkercourt stated that the plaintiff did not seek a good from an insurance office but instead accessed a benefit plan that her employer provided.14
Such a benefit plan, according to the court, is not a good that a public accommodation offers.14 The court reasoned that the plaintiff did not access her
141. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (providing Carpartscourt's conclusion that public accommodations need not have physical structures).
142. See supranotes 87-90 and accompanying text (discussing firsttwo factors that courts
must consider in determining if Title III cause of action exists).
143. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
bane) (stating that "District Court properly granted summary judgment on behalf of the
defendants"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
144. Id. at 1012; see supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text (discussing third factorwhether Title III governs contents of goods and services-that courts must address in determining if Title III cause of action exists).
145. Parker,121 F.3d at 1012 (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 630 (1996)). In the
regulation, the DOJ explained: "[A] bookstore, for example, must make its facilities and sales
operations accessible to individuals with disabilities, but is not required to stock Brailled or
large print books. Similarly, a video store must make its facilities and rental operations accessible, but is not required to stock closed-captioned video tapes." Id (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 36,
app. B, at 630).
146. Id
147. Id
148. Id. at 1011.
149. Id. at 1012.
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plan from the insurance office and that the public cannot enter into the office
of either the insurance company or the employer and obtain the same disability plan.' The court therefore stated that a nexus did not exist between the
services that MetLife offered to the public from its insurance office and the
terms of the plaintiff's disability plan.'

In support of its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit again considered the

regulations implementing Title II. 52 In the regulations, the DOJ explained
that "[t]he Department intends for wholesale establishments to be covered...
as places of public accommodation except in cases where they sell exclusively
to other businesses and not to individuals." ' Based upon this explanation,
the Sixth Circuit concluded its analysis by stating that a disability plan which
an insurance company offers solely to a business on a discounted
rate is not
54
a good or service that a place of public accommodation offers.1
Based upon the resolution of the above issues, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Title III does not govern a long-term disability plan which an
employer provides to its employees. 55 In reaching this conclusion, the court
provided answers to two of the four factors that courts must address when
assessing a Title III claim - whether Title III governs the contents of goods
and services and whether Title III only prohibits discrimination that a public
accommodation inflicts directly upon individuals with disabilities."5 6 How150. Id.atlOl.
151. Id. The Third Circuit in Fordv. Schering-PloughCorp.also concluded that when an
employee receives benefits from an insurance company via her employment, the employee lacks
a nexus to the insurance office and thus does not suffer from discrimination in connection with
apublic accommodation. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601,612-13 (3d Cir. 1998)
(discussing lack of nexus between employee's benefit plan and services provided by insurance
office), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 850 (1999).
152. Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011-12 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
153. Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 604 (1996)).
154. Id. at 1012.
155. Id. at 1014. In addition to resolving the Title III claim, the Sixth Circuit determined
that the ADA does not mandate equality between individuals with different disabilities and
would therefore allow distinctions between benefits for physical versus mental disabilities. Id.
at 1015. The court concluded that the ADA prohibits only discrimination between the disabled
and the nondisabled. Id Although this issue is beyond the scope of this Note, it is a concern.
See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1169 (E.D. Va. 1997) (concluding that
providing unequal benefits for physical versus mental disabilities violates ADA); Shannon,
supranote 3, at 66-67 (noting that insurance plans typically provide less coverage for mental
health treatment than for physical ailments); Tucker, supra note 3, at 925-26 (discussing
EEOC's view that distinctions in coverage for physical conditions versus mental conditions are
not disability based).
156. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (describing last two factors that courts
must consider in determining whether Title III
cause of action exists).
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ever, these factors are the two that the Carparts court did not address."5 7
Because neither the First Circuit nor the Sixth Circuit adequately resolved all
four factors, the decisions reached by these courts failed to produce a decisive
answer to the question of the potential liability of an insurance company that
issues employer-provided insurance plans. 5 '
V The BroadScope of Title III: Applying the FourFactors
A. Title III Is Not Limited to ProtectingPhysicalAccess into
Places of PublicAccommodation
The Carpartscourt determined that Title III does not require a plaintiff
to demonstrate that the defendant public accommodation was a tangible,
physical structure.' 59 Many lower courts have extrapolated from Carpartsa
second conclusion: Title III plaintiffs do not have to demonstrate that the
defendant denied them actual physical access to a place of public accommodation." Indeed, if Carpartsis correct as to its limited conclusion, then the
second conclusion necessarily follows.'6 ' This Note suggests that, ironically,
the Carpartscourt may have erred in concluding that physical structures are
irrelevant to a Title III claim, yet the conclusion that lower courts have extrapolated from the First Circuit's opinion is accurate. 62 Lower courts have
persuasively concluded that Title III is not limited to eradicating merely
157. See supranote 119 and accompanying text (discussing failure of Carpartscourt to
address third and fourth factors).
158. Compare supra notes 106-20 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's
analysis) with supranotes 130-57 and accompanying text (providing Sixth Circuit's reasoning).
159. See supra Part IV.B.1 (providing First Circuit's determination that public accommodations are not limited to actual physical structures).
160. See World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (citing
Carpartsdecision as support for statement that scope of Title III "extends beyond the mere
denial of physical access to places of public accommodation"), aff'd in part,vacated in part,
156 F.3d 1142 (1 th Cir. 1998); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299, 302 (N.D.
Cal. 1997) (stating that interpreting Title III to prohibit only physical barriers to access to public
accommodation is not consistent with statutory language of Title III); Shultz v. Hemet Youth
Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that Title III does not
limit "place of public accommodation" to actual physical structures with physical boundaries);
Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 425 (D.N.H. 1996) (suggesting that
Carpartscourt already determined that Title III does not merely prohibit public accommodations from denying physical access); Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316,
1321 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that Title III does not bar only discrimination in access to
physical structures).
161. Seesupranotes109-10 and accompanying text (providing logic ofsecond conclusion
following from Carpartscourt's conclusion).
162. See supranote 160 and accompanying text (discussing conclusions of lower courts).
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physical barriers to places of public accommodation."' The language of Title
III and the intent underlying the ADA reveals that Title III prohibits less overt

discrimination as well. 164

1. The FirstCircuit'sAnalysis of Section 301(7)
Two district courts have relied upon the Carpartscourt's limited conclu-

sion that a public accommodation need not have an actual physical structure
as support for their own conclusions that Title III extends beyond protecting
physical access into places of public accommodation.165 The First Circuit's
interpretation of Title III, however, confused the true issue. This is not
surprising given the confusing language that Congress employed in defining

"public accommodation"'6 and in describing the general prohibition of discrimination by public accommodations. 67
One problem evident in-Title III's list of private entities that "are considered public accommodations" 6 ' is that the list unambiguously includes insurance offices. 69 However, whether an insurance office is actually a private
entity is uncertain. An entity is "[a]n organization or being that possesses
separate existence for tax purposes."'"7 Corporations and partnerships are
entities.' Congress's definition of entities throughout the ADA conforms to
the definition of an "entity" as an organization or being." z The insurance
163. See infranotes 194-225 and accompanying text (determining that Title III protections
extend beyond ensuring physical access for individuals with disabilities).
164. See infra notes 194-225 and accompanying text (providing analysis of Title III).
165. See World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 966 F. Supp. 1203, 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (citing
Carpartscourt's decision that Title III
does not limit public accommodation to actual physical
structure as support for court's own conclusion that Title III extends beyond prohibiting
physical access to places of public accommodation), aff'd in part,vacated in part, 156 F.3d
1142 (1 lth Cir. 1998); Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422,425 (D.N.H.
1996) (same).
166. See ADA § 301(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994) (defining public accommodation).
167. See ADA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (providing general prohibition against
discrimination by public accommodations).
168. ADA § 301(7), 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
169. See ADA § 301(7)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (listing insurance office as public
accommodation).
170. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 532(6th ed. 1990).
See id. (providing examples of entities).
171.
172. Compare ADA § 301(6), 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6) (1994) (stating that "private entity"
means entity other than public entity) with ADA § 201(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1213 1(1) (stating that
"public entity" means State or local government, department or agency of State or local
government, and commuter authority). A government, a department or agency, and a commuter
authority are certainly not physical structures.
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company, not the insurance office as listed in Title III, has a separate legal
existence and therefore constitutes the private entity.
Another problem exists when one substitutes the words "insurance office"
for "public accommodation" in Section 302(a). Section302(a)wouldthenread:
"No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability.., by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates aplaceof[insurance
office]."' The term "office" already indicates a place. '7 4 The term "place"
would be superfluous ifan insurance office is actuallyapublic accommodation.
The DOJ recognized the contradictions inherent in the language Congress
used to define "public accommodations" and provided the most sensible
solution." 5 In its regulations implementing Title HI, the DOJ stated that a
"public accommodation" is the private entity that owns, leases, or operates a
place of public accommodation,'" and therefore "public accommodation"
corresponds to "person" in Section 302(a)." 8 The DOJ defined a "place of
public accommodation" as a facility listed in Section 301(7) that a private
entity operates and whose operations affect commerce. 79 Thus, the DOJ
concluded that Section 301(7), which includes an insurance office, actually
lists places of public accommodation as opposed to private entities or public
8
accommodations. D
The DOJ's conclusion is consistentwith Section 302(a), which prohibits
discrimination by a person who owns, operates, or leases a place of public
accommodation. '' The public accommodation is the private entity that owns,
operates, or leases a facility listed in Section 301(7).1"2 Thus, Title III prohibits discrimination by the private entity, such as an insurance company, that
owns, operates, or leases a facility, such as an insurance office.' Applying
173.

See ADA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added) (stating general prohibi-

tion of discrimination by public accommodations).
174. See WEBsTER's NEw WORLD DICriONARY 941 (3d ed. 1991) (defining "office" as
"place" in which "the affairs of a business... are carried on").
175. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B., at 603 (1996) (comparing "public accommodation" to
"place of public accommodation").

176.
177.
178.

28 C.F.R pt. 36.
28 C.F.R pt. 36, app. B, at 603.
Id. at 606.

179. See id. at 603-04 (defining "place of public accommodation").
180. See id at 603 (stating that "definition of place of public accommodation incorporates
the 12 categories of facilities represented in the statutory definition of public accommodation

in section 301(7) of the ADA").
181. Iel
182. See id.(stating that public accommodation is "the private entity that owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation").
183. See id (asserting that Title III prohibits discrimination by private entities).
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this interpretation to Section 302(a) and again substituting terms yields a more
rational result. Section 302(a) would then read: 'No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services... of any [insurance office] by any [insurance company
that] owns, leases (or leases to), or operates [an insurance office]."'' Thus,
as the DOJ regulations suggest, thepublic accommodation is the subject of the
nondiscrimination requirements of Title III and cannot discriminate in the
goods, services, facilities, accommodations, privileges, and advantages ofthe
actual facility.18 5
Based upon the DOJ's resolution of Title III's conflicting language, the
Carpartscourt erred in concluding that the items in the list in Section 301(7)
are not actual physical structures." 6 In addition to stating that a place of
public accommodation is a facility listed in Section 301(7),"' 7the DOJ defined
a facility as a physical structure.'"8 Therefore, according to the DOJ, each
item in Section 301(7) is a physical structure." 9 The DOJ's interpretation is
consistent with the Parkercourt's conclusion that the words in Section 301(7)
refer to physical places.' However, the Parkercourt erred in stating that a
public accommodation is a physical place. 9' The DOJ demonstrated that the
place of public accommodation, not the actual public accommodation, is the
physical place. 9 2
The DOJ's interpretation supports the Parkercourt's determination that
the items in Section 301(7) are actual physical places and suggests that the
184. See ADA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) (providing general prohibition of
discrimination by public accommodations).
185. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 603 (1996) (noting that public accommodation, not
place of public accommodation, is subject to nondiscrimination requirements).
186. See supranotes 168-85 and accompanying text (describing DOJ's interpretation of
Title III's language and flaws in Carpartscourt's interpretation of"public accommodations").
187. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (providing DOJ's explanation that Section 301(7) lists facilities).
188. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 602. The DOJ stated that facility "means all or any
portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances,
roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site
where the building, property, structure, or equipment is located." I
189. See supranotes 187-89 and accompanying text (explaining logic in conclusion that
items in Section 301(7) are physical places).
190. See supratext accompanying note 132 (stating that Parkercourt concluded that items
in Section 301(7) are physical places).
191. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
bane) (stating that, based on Section 301(7), "apublic accommodation is a physical place"),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
192. See supranotes 175-89 and accompanying text (providing logic for conclusion that
place of public accommodation is physical structure).

INSURANCE COMPANY LLABILITY UNDER TITLE Iff OF THE ADA 369
Carpartscourt was wrong in stating that those items need not have physical
structures. Based on the DOJ regulations, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
a private entity discriminated against him on the basis of a disability in the
enjoyment of goods and services available from an actual physical structure. 93
Therefore, a court should not rely upon the Carpartscourt's potentially wrong
conclusion that the items listed in Section 301(7) are not necessarily physical
structures to supportthe argumentthat Title III does not prevent only discrimination in the physical access to physical structures. It is therefore necessary
to look to the broad language and legislative history of Title III to support the
conclusion that Title III protects more than physical access into places of
public accommodation.
2. The BroadLanguage of Title III
The broad language of Title III supports the conclusion that Title III does
not address only physical barriers to places of public accommodation. 194 The
courts that have interpreted Title III as only prohibiting the denial of physical
access to a place of public accommodation have focused too narrowly on the
word "place."'9 5 This narrow focus has several flaws. First, it ignores the fact
that only certain sections of Title III specifically discuss physical barriers. 6
Second, it renders superfluous much of the language of Title III. 97 Finally,
it severely restricts the protections that Title III extends to individuals who do
not have an actual physical or mental disability but do have a "disability" as
the ADA defines that term. 198
193. See supra notes 175-89 and accompanying text (demonstrating that place of public
accommodation is physical structure).
194. See infranotes203-14 and accompanyingtext(analyzing broad language ofTitleIII).
195. See Elittv. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217,223 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (suggesting that,
based on language in Sections 301(7) and 302(a) of Title III, plaintiff had to show denial of
access to ice rink asplaceof public accommodation in orderto have successful Title III claim);
Pappas v. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n, 861 F. Supp. 616, 620 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (stating that, based
on ordinary, common meaning of words of Section 302(a), Title III is limited to protecting
disabled person's ability to make physical use of services of place of public accommodation).
The Pappascourt stated that a proper example of a Title III claim would be an allegation that
an office failed to make accommodations for an individual who required the use ofawheelchair
in order to access the place of public accommodation. Id.
196. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (discussing sections of Title III that
specifically prohibit discrimination through use of physical barriers).
197. See infranotes 203-10 and accompanying text (providing explanation ofhow narrow
interpretation of Title III renders language superfluous).
198. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text (discussing various individuals Title
III would fail to protect if Title III only prevented denial of physical access to places of public
accommodation).
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Nothing in the plain language of Title III narrows its protection to ensuring only physical access to a place of public accommodation.' 99 Section
302(a), the general provision of Title III that prohibits discrimination by
public accommodations, does not refer to access to physical structures. 2"

Sections 302(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v) are the only sections of Title III that refer
specifically to physical barriers to places of public accommodation as prohibited discrimination."0 ' It is in these sections that Congress specifically intended to address physical access into places of public accommodation.2 2
Interpreting Title III as prohibiting only physical barriers would render
certain language of Title III superfluous.2 3 Title IIlists the general activities
by a public accommodation that Section 302(a) prohibits.2' One of these
general activities involves denying an individual with a disability "the opportunity ... to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 20 5 Interpreting Title
III as prohibiting only denial of physical access to public accommodations
1998)
199. See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Ill.
(stating that "the plain language of Title III's anti-discrimination provisions nowhere indicates
that Title III's scope is limited to questions of access"); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co., 964 F.
Supp. 299, 302-03 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that plain language of Title HI should not be
limited to prohibiting only discrimination in providing physical access); Kotev v. First Colony
Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that plain language of Title III
demonstrates that Title III does not prohibit only denial of physical access to places of public
accommodation).
200. Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1321. For the full text of Section 302(a), see supra text
accompanying note 72.
201.
See Kotev, 927 F. Supp. at 1322 (stating that only Sections 302(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v) refer
specifically to the prohibition of physical barriers). Section 302(b)(2)(A)(iv) provides that
discrimination includes "a failure to remove architectural barriers, and communication barriers
that are structural in nature, in existing facilities... where such removal is readily achievable."
ADA § 302(b)(2)(A)(iv), 42U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) (1994). Section302(b)(2)(A)(v) states
that discrimination also includes "where an entity can demonstrate that the removal of a barrier
under clause (iv) is not readily achievable, a failure to make such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods if such
methods are readily achievable." ADA § 302(b)(2)(A)(v), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v).
202. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 59-60 (1990) (discussing that Sections
302(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v) address need for access into buildings), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 482-83.
203. See Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (stating that interpreting Title III as applying only to physical barriers to entry would
render meaningless provisions that require equal access to goods or services); Cloutier, 964 F.
Supp. at 302 (noting that interpreting Title III to prohibit only physical barriers to access of
public accommodations would dispense with plain language of Title III).
204. See ADA § 302(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b) (describing general activities by public
accommodation that violate Title II).
205. ADA § 302(b)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
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dispenses with the language mandating equal opportunity to benefit from the
"goods," "services," "privileges," and "advantages."2"s Thus, if Title III only
prohibits the denial of physical access, it would only be necessary to mandate
equal opportunity
to benefit from the "facilities" and "accommodations" of an
207
entity.
Congress used the nouns "goods," "services," "privileges," and "advan-

tages" not only in the provision mandating equal opportunity but repeatedly
throughout the statute. 0 5 This use demonstrates the significance that Congress placed on each noun.2' Thus, if Congress intended for Title Ill to
protect only physical access to public accommodations, much of the language
in Title I would be meaningless. Because courts should construe statutes 21
in
a manner that avoids rendering any language within them superfluous, 1

courts interpreting Title III should not limit Title III to eradicating only
physical barriers to places of public accommodation.
Interpreting Title III to protect only physical access would narrow its
scope to the point that Title I would only prevent discrimination against
some of the individuals that the ADA expressly protects.
In addition to
protecting individuals with mental or physical impairments, the ADA also

protects two categories of individuals who are not impaired: those whom
206. Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299, 302 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
207. See ADA §302(b)(1)(A)(i), 42U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (statingthatpublic
accommodations cannot deny disabled individuals opportunity to benefit from "the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity").
208. Cloutier,964 F. Supp. at 302 n.2. For examples of other sections of Title III that use
the various nouns listed, see ADA §§ 302(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii)(iii). The court in Chabnerv. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Cal.
1998) noted that interpreting Title III as prohibiting only physical barriers would render
meaningless the provision in Section 302(b)(1)(A)(ii) that ensures equal access to goods and
services. Idl at 1190. Section 302(b)(1)(A)(ii) provides:
It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis
of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class... with the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or
accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals.
ADA §302(b)(1)(A)(ii), 42U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). The nouns emphasized are also located in the general provision in Section 302(a). See ADA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(a) (describing general rule prohibiting discrimination by public accommodations).
Thus, if Title III only governed physical access to physical structures, Section 302(a) only
would need to prevent discrimination in "the full and equal enjoyment of the.. . facilities...
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." Id.
209. Cloutier,964 F. Supp. at 302 n.2.
210. Chabner,994 F. Supp. at 1190 (quotingAstoriaFed. Sav. &LoanAss'nv. Solimino,
501 U.S. 104, 112 (1991)); Cloutier,964 F. Supp. at 302 (quoting Astoria, 501 U.S. at 112).
211. Kotevv. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321-22 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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others regard as being impaired and those who have a record of impairment.2 12
Title III specifically protects individuals who face discrimination "because of
the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is
2 3 If Title III ensures only
known to have a relationship or association.""
physical access to places of public accommodation, then many of the individuals who do not have physical impairments, but whom the ADA still protects,
could bring a Title III claim only if they could demonstrate that a place of
public accommodation took affirmative steps to prevent their physical
access.2 14 Thus, if Title III protects only physical access into places of public
accommodation, then many of the ADA's protections would be meaningless.
3. Legislative History
In addition to the broad statutory language of Title III, the legislative
history supports the conclusion that Title III protects more than physical
access into places of public accommodation.2" 5 During the ADA legislative
hearings, Congress heard testimony by witnesses describing why individuals
with disabilities do not frequent places of public accommodation.2 16 Witnesses identified the major areas of discrimination that Congress needed to
address.2" 7 Only one of these areas concerned the lack of physical access to
facilities.2 " Congress was thus aware of areas of discrimination beyond the
lack of physical access to facilities.219
In Senate Report 101-116, the Committee on Labor and Human Resources did not describe the denial of physical access as the only type of
discrimination that violates Title III. 22 The Committee explained that a
restaurant which allowed an individual with Down's Syndrome to sit at a
counter, but not in the table-seating section, would violate Title III.
The
Committee also stated that atheater or restaurant cannot require an individual
212.
213.

Id (citing ADA § 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)).
Id. at 1322 (quoting ADA § 302(b)(1)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(E) (1994)).

214. Id.
215. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt 2, at 35-36 (1990) (discussing various reasons why
individuals with disabilities do not frequent places of public accommodation as often as other
Americans), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 316-18; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 62 (1989)
(providing illustrations of violations of Title III).
216. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 35-36 (discussing witnesses' reasons why

individuals with disabilities do not frequent places of public accommodations as often as other
Americans), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 316-18.
217. Id at35.
218. Id
219. See id. at 35-36 (describing testimony that witnesses provided to Congress).
220. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 62 (providing examples of Title III violations).
221. Id

INSURANCE COMPANY LIABILITY UNDER TITLE III OF THE ADA 373
with a wheelchair to have a chaperone.'m The discrimination in these examples is not only a denial of access, but is also a restriction on the disabled
individual's ability to enjoy fully the goods and services offered by the place
of public accommodation.
Several courts have determined that Title III protects only physical access
into physical structures.' The plain language and legislative history of Title
III demonstrate, however, that the protections of Title III extend beyond this
limited protection. 4 Thus, a public accommodation not only must allow an
individual with a disability inside the physical structure, but also must provide
that individual with equal enjoyment of the good or service that the place of
public accommodation offers.'
B. Title lIIDoes Not Require PhysicalPresence
In concluding that public accommodations are not physical structures, the
First Circuit indirectly determined that individuals need not be physically
present inside a place of public accommodation for Title I to protect them
against discrimination. 6 The Carpartscourt may have erred, however, in
concluding that the establishments listed in Section 301(7) need not have
physical structures. 7 Although courts therefore should not rely on the First
Circuit's conclusion about the meaning of public accommodations,' the
Carpartscourt provided additional support for the argument that Title III does
not merely prevent discrimination which occurs while an individual is physically present inside a place of public accommodation. 9
222. Id.
223. See supranote 195 and accompanying text (discussing view thatTitle III protects only
physical access to physical structures).
224. See supra notes 194-222 (analyzing language and legislative history of Title III to
demonstrate that Title III protections extend beyond ensuring physical access to places of public
accommodation).
225. Seesupranotes205-09 and accompanying text (explaining thatTitle III mandates full
and equal enjoyment ofgoods and services as well as of facilities and accommodations ofplaces
of public accommodation).
226. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discussing First Circuit's treatment
of issue concerning whether individuals need to be physically present inside place of public
accommodation to have Title III claim).
227. See supra Part W.B. I (providing First Circuit's conclusion that items in Section 301(7) need not be physical structures).
228. See supraPart V.A.1 (describing flaws in Carpartscourt's interpretation of"public
accommodation").
229. See supranotes 112-14 and accompanying text (discussing Capartscourt's statement
that Congress would not have intended for Title III not to protect individuals with disabilities
who purchase goods through correspondence or by telephone).
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The First Circuit stated that by including the term "travel service" in
Section 301(7), Congress intended that service establishments include public

accommodations that do not require an individual to enter into a physical
structure to receive the services offered.' 0 As the court reasoned, many travel
services conduct business with individuals over the telephone or through
correspondence."' The same is true of insurance companies. 2 Customers
often purchase insurance policies without physically entering the insurance
office. 3
Because insurance provides individuals with disabilities with the means

to participate fully in society,

4

an interpretation of Title III requiring an

individual to physically enter a place of public accommodation in order to
receive Title III protections would conflict with Congress's intent to bring

individuals with disabilities into the social and economic mainstream of
American life. 5 An insurance office would be able to avoid the provisions
of Title III by simply marketing its policies through the mail." This certainly
would defeat Congress's intent."
Other courts have agreed with the Carparts court's conclusion that
a plaintiff need not be physically present at a place of public accommodation to establish a Title III claim. 8 In Lewis v. Aetna Life Insurance
230. See supra text accompanying note 113 (presenting First Circuit's statement that by
including term "travel service," Congress intended service establishments to include public
accommodations that do not require individuals to physically enter building to obtain goods or
services).
231. See supra text accompanying note 114 (discussing Carpartscourt's reasoning).
232. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1997) (stating
that customers often purchase insurance policies without ever physically entering insurance

office).
233. Id.
234. See Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 427 (D.N.H. 1996)
(stating that "it is often insurance coverage that will determine a disabled person's ability to
prevent the disability from limiting his or her participation in society" (quoting Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 192-93 (6th Cir.), reh'genbanc grantedand vacated,
107 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 1996), reh'gen banc, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 871 (1998))).
235. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22 (1990) (stating that purpose of ADA is to
bring individuals with disabilities into economic and social mainstream of American life),
reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989) (same).
236. Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1165.
237. See supranote 235 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's intent in enacting

ADA).
238. See Lewis v. AetnaLife Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1164 (E.D. Va. 1997) (concluding that Title III protections extend to goods not purchased in physical office); Doukas, 950 F.
Supp. at 425 (D.N.H. 1996) (citing First Circuit's reasoning that Congress intended to protect
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Co., 2 9 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
provided further support for the assertion that Title III prevents discrimination
against individuals with disabilities even though the individual did not physically enter an office to obtain goods and services.24 ° The court agreed with the
First Circuit that ignoring the language of Title III and adopting a contrary
interpretation would mean that Title HI would not permit a public accommodation to discriminate when an individual purchases goods and services while
on its physical premises but would allow discrimination when an individual
purchases the same goods or services over the telephone or through the mail.24 1
The court demonstrated the irrational nature of such a result by providing an
example of a department store that could not refuse to sell shoes to disabled
customers who visited the store's physical business location but could refuse
to sell shoes to customers with disabilities who chose to order through the
those purchasing services by mail or over telephone as support for its determination that Title
III does not merely protect physical access to places of public accommodation); Sharrow v.
Bailey, 910F. Supp. 187, 192 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (stating that fact that denial oftreatmentdidnot
occur on defendant's physical premises does not defeat Title III claim); Baker v. Hartford Life
Ins. Co., No. 94-C-4416, 1995 WL 573430, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995) (stating that ADA
does not require plaintiff to be physically present at place of public accommodation in order to
be entitled to nondiscriminatory treatment).
239. 982 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Va. 1997).
240. Lewisv. AetnaLife Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1164 (E.D. Va. 1997). In Lewis, the
court considered whether Lewis had a valid Title III claim against the insurance company that
issued his employer-provided disability insurance plan. Id. at 1160. Severe depression had
forced Lewis to leave his position as Store Manager at K-mart, and Lewis began receiving
disability benefits pursuant to an Aetna Life Insurance Company insurance plan. Id. at 1159.
However, the plan terminated disability payments after only 24 months because Lewis's
disability was not physical in nature. Id at 1159-60. Lewis sued Aetna under Title III and
claimed that Aetna had discriminated against him on the basis of a disability in violation of the
ADA. Id. at 1160. In considering Lewis's claim, the court looked for guidance from the
Carpartsdecision and determined that Title III protections extend to goods not purchased in
a physical office. Id. at 1163-65. The court agreed with the Carpartscourt's assertion that the
opposite construction of Title III would yield an irrational result. Id. at 1164-65. The court
determined that, based on the statutory language of Title III which provides that a Title III
violation occurs whether the public accommodation acts directly or indirectly through contractual or other arrangements, an insurer may not write discriminatory insurance plans regardless
of the fact that the employee obtains the insurance via an employer. Id at 1165. In addition
to the Title III claim, the court determined that the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis
of a particular disability and is not limited to discrimination between the disabled and the
nondisabled. Id. at 1168. The court also considered the plaintiff's Title I claim against his
employer and stated that an employer violates Title I by discriminating in the terms of an
employer-provided plan, which is a fringe benefit of employment that Title I governs. Id. at
1160-61. The court ultimately denied the employer's and insurance company's motions to
dismiss. Id at 1169.
241. Id.at 1165.
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store's catalog.242 The court stated that Congress could not have intended to
withhold the ADA's protections from the millions of individuals with disabilities who purchase goods by telephone or through home delivery.243 Such a
result would conflict with Congress's intent to provide a comprehensive
mandate to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 2 "
The discrimination that Title III prohibits sometimes occurs when an
individual with a disability has contact with a public accommodation only
over the telephone or through home delivery.245 Section 302(a) forbids
discrimination against an individual with a disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods and services of a place of public accommodation.24 6
A public accommodation is capable of denying an individual the full and
equal enjoyment of goods and services withoutthe individual being physically
present inside the place of public accommodation.2 47 For example, in Baker
v. HarifordLifeInsuranceCo.,24 the insurance company informed the plaintiff s father over the telephone and through correspondence that it would deny
coverage for the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's medical history of seizure
disorder.249 Thus, the insurance company denied the plaintiff the full and
242. Id.; cf Sharrow, 910 F. Supp. at 192 (noting illogical result of requiring plaintiff to
be physically present at place of public accommodation). The Sharrow court explained: "To
superimpose on the statute a requirement that the plaintiff must present himself or herself at the
defendant's place of business and there be denied service or receive unequal service would be
illogical and contrary to the underlying intent of the Act." Id.
243. Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1165.
244. Id. (quoting ADA § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994)).
245. See Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 94-C-4416, 1995 WL 573430, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 28, 1995) (stating thatADAprohibited discriminationwhich occurred when plaintiff's
father had telephone conversation with insurance office).
246. ADA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
247. See Baker, 1995 WL 573430, at *3 (stating that discrimination against individual in
full and equal enjoyment of goods and services of place of public accommodation can occur
when plaintiff is not physically present at place of public accommodation).
248.
1995 WL 573430 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 1995).
249. Baker v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., No. 94-C-4416, 1995 WL 573430, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 28, 1995). In Baker,the court considered defendant Hartford Life Insurance Company's
motion to dismiss plaintiff Nicholas Baker's Title III claim. Id. Baker's father applied for
health insurance for Baker through Hartford Life Insurance Company. Id. Hartford Life
Insurance Company informed Baker's father over the telephone and through correspondence
that it would deny the application because of Baker's history of seizure disorder. Id. The court
closely analyzed the language of Title III and determined that Baker deserved Title III protection because the insurance office was a place owned, leased, or operated by the insurance
company, and because the company denied Baker its good - insurance - on the basis of a
disability. Id. at *3. The court stated that Title III does not require a plaintiff to be physically
present at the place ofpublic accommodation to enjoy the nondiscrimination provisions of Title
III. Id. The court considered the effect of Section 50 1(c) on Baker's claim and recognized the
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equal enjoyment of insurance coverage," 0 which is the good the company
offered, without the plaintiff ever having physically entered the insurance
office." Another example is the situation in which a patient calls a dentist
or a physician, informs the dentist or physician of her HIV status, and the
dentist or physician denies the patient treatment on the basis of this
disability. 2 In this instance, the doctor denied the plaintiffimedical treatment
provided by the doctor's office - a place of public accommodation. 3
In both of these examples, the actions of the public accommodation
violate Section 302(b)(1)(A)(i) of Title HI.'
This section prohibits the
denial, on the basis of a disability, ofthe opportunity to benefit from the goods
or services of a place of public accommodation." In each example, the
public accommodation refused to provide the disabled individual with the
opportunity to benefit from the goods that the public accommodation offers.
Based upon the statutory language of Title III and the irrational nature of a
contrary interpretation, it is possible for a place of public accommodation although a physical structure - to violate Title III's general rule against
discrimination even when a plaintiff has not attempted to access a good or
service by physically entering a physical office.
C. Title Ii Governs the Contents of Goods andServices
In Parker,the Sixth Circuit determined that Title III governs only the
availability, as opposed to the contents, of the goods and services that a public
possibility that the insurance company did not base its denial on considerations of risk classification, and therefore, Baker may have a claim. Id at *4. The court ultimately denied Hartford

Life Insurance Company's motion to dismiss. Id
250. See id. at *3 (citing ADA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994)) (stating that
insurance office denied plaintiff its service). The court explained that the "insurance office was
a place that was owned, leased, or operated by defendant, and plaintiff was denied a service of
this office, insurance, on the basis of his disability." Id. (citing ADA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(a)).
251. See id (noting that only contact plaintiff had with insurance office was through his
father by telephone or correspondence).
252. See Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187, 192 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (describing as
violation of Title III situation in which patient calls dentist or physician, informs her of
disability such as HIV-positive status, and is denied treatment on basis of disability).
253. See ADA § 301(7)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (listing professional office of health
care provider as "service establishment").
254. See ADA § 302(b)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i) (providing that denial of
opportunity to benefit from goods and services of place of public accommodation violates Title
II1). For the full text of Section 302(b)(1)(A)(i), see supra note 79.
255. See ADA § 302(b)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i) (providing that denial of
opportunity to benefit from goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of place of public accommodation violates Title III).
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accommodation offers. 6 In making its determination, the court relied solely
on the DOJ regulations implementing Title III."5 The regulations state that
the ADA does not alter the nature or mix of goods that a public accommodation offers. 8 The Parkercourt specifically relied on the following statement
in the DOJ regulations:
The purpose of the ADA's public accommodations requirements is to
ensure accessibility to the goods offered by a public accommodation, not
to alter the nature or mix of goods that the public accommodation has
typically provided. In other words, a bookstore, for example, must make
its facilities and sales operations accessible to individuals with disabilities,
but is not required to stock Brailled or large print books. Similarly, a video
store must make its facilities and rental operations accessible, but is not
required to stock closed-captioned video tapes." 9
The court erred in relying upon the above DOJ statement as support for
the conclusion that Title III does not govern the contents of goods or services.
In a separate statement applying specifically to insurance policies, the DOJ
explicitly stated that Title III governs the content of insurance policies. 6 The
DOJ provided:
Insurance offices are places of public accommodation and, as such, may
not discriminate on the basis of disability in the sale of insurance contracts
or in the terms or conditions of the insurance contracts they offer. Because
of the nature of the insurance business, however, consideration of disability in the sale of insurance contracts does not always constitute "discrimination." An insurer or other public accommodation may underwrite,
classify, or administer risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law, provided that such practices are not used to evade the purposes of the
ADA.26'
This statement demonstrates the DOJ's determination that, except in certain
circumstances, Title III governs the terms of insurance policies. The Sixth
Circuit failed to mention or to explain why it ignored the DOJ's explicit
256. Seesupranotes144-46 and accompanying text(explainingParker court's determination that Title III does not govern contents of goods and services).
257. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1012 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (relying upon DOJ regulations as support for conclusion that Title III does not govern
contents of goods and services), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
258. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 630 (1996).
259. Parker,121 F.3d at 1012 (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 630).
260. See DEPARTMENTOFJUSICE, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCEMANUAL IH-3.11000 (Jan. 24,
1992), reprintedinAMERJCANS WrrHDIsABIriTEs ACTMANUAL (BNA) 90:0917 (stating that
Title III governs terms of insurance policies).
261. Id.
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finding related to insurance and instead focused solely on other DOJ regulations that required the court to draw analogies that are ultimately futile.262
In the section of the regulations upon which the Parkercourt relied, the
DOJ focused on accessible or special goods.263 The purpose of the section is
to establish that Title III "does not require a public accommodation to alter its
inventory to include accessible or special goods with accessibility features
that are designed for, or facilitate use by, individuals with disabilities."2" The
DOJ provided examples of accessible or special goods, including Brailled
versions of books, closed-captioned videotapes, special sizes of clothing, and
special foods to meet particular dietary needs.265 The DOJ was emphasizing
that a public accommodation does not have to provide goods to individuals
with disabilities beyond what it usually provides to others.2
When an individual who is blind wishes to obtain Brailled books from a
bookstore that does not provide Brailled books, the individual seeks something that the bookstore does not typically provide and that is specially designed for use by individuals with disabilities. When an individual with a
disability sues an insurance company on the basis of discriminatory terms in
an insurance policy, however, the individual is seeking the same protection
from the economic risks of disease that the insurance company already provides to other individuals.267 For example, in Lewis, the plaintiff sued an
insurance company because the insurance company provided disability
insurance for individuals with mental disabilities for a shorter period of time
262. See Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012 n.5 (noting that "Department of Justice has in other
writings interpreted Title III
to include regulation of the substantive terms of insurance contracts").
263. See 28 C.F.R pt. 36, app. B, at 630 (designating section upon which Parkercourt
relies as "Accessible or Special Goods").
264. Id,
265. Id.
266. See id (stating that ADA does not require public accommodation to alter nature or
mix of goods that it typically provides).
267. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997)
(en banc) (describing plaintiff's claim against insurance company that insurer did not provide
disability benefits to individuals with mental disabilities for same amount of time that it
provided same benefits to individuals with physical disabilities), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871
(1998); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 14 (lst Cir.
1994) (explaining that plaintiffs sued because insurance plan limited benefits for AIDS-related
illnesses to $25,000, but plan otherwise provided lifetime benefits in amount of $1 million per
eligible plan member); Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1159-60 (E.D. Va.
1997) (describing plaintiff's claim against insurance company that insurer did not provide
disability benefits to individuals with mental disabilities for same amount of time that it
provided same benefits to individuals with physical disabilities); Leonard F. v. Israel Discount
Bank, 967 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (same).
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than it provided disability insurance for individuals with physical disabilities.26 The plaintiff was not trying to obtain a plan that the insurance company did not already provide or that was specially designed for his specific
disability.269 Rather, the plaintiff wanted a plan that did not specifically consider his type of disability and that was comparable to plans that the insurance
company already provided to others.27
The bookstore example would be comparable to discrimination in the
terms of an insurance plan only if the bookstore refused to provide individuals
with disabilities books on a certain subject or books that a certain author
wrote.27 For the bookstore to provide ordinary books to individuals with
disabilities would not require the bookstore to alter the nature or mix of goods
that it typically provides and, therefore, would not do what the DOJ interpreted Title III to prevent.272 Thus, the Parkercourt mistakenly relied on the
DOJ regulations concerning accessible or special goods in determining that
Title III does not govern the contents of goods or services and, therefore, does
not govern the contents of insurance policies.2' The court should have
focused its attention on the provisions directly applying to insurance rather
than attempting to create an argument based upon regulations that are in no
manner applicable in the insurance context.
The language of Title III also supports the conclusion that the Parker
court erred in stating that Title III does not govern the contents of goods or
services of a place of public accommodation.2
Section 302(b)(1)(A)(iii)
states that it is discriminatory to provide an individual, on the basis of a
disability, with a good or service that is different from that provided to other
268.
269.

Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1159-60.
Id.
kd

270.
271. See supranotes 263-70 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ's bookstore example).
272. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 630 (1996) (stating that Title III does not require
public accommodation to alter nature or mix of goods it typically provides).
273. See supra notes 260-72 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in Parkercourt's
reliance on DOJ regulations).
274. See Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 425 (D.N.H. 1996)
(stating that, based on plain statutory language, Title III extends to substance or contents of
insurance policy); Storer, supranote 4, at 1036 (stating that terms of private insurance contracts
are covered under Title III's provisions as goods and services). But see Cooper, supra note 91,
at 45-46 (demonstrating that Title III does not apply to product design, including insurance
contracts). In deciding that Title III does not govern the terms of insurance contracts or
policies, Cooper relied on the same DOJ regulations on which the Parkercourt relied. See id.
(relying on DOJ commentary stating that Title III does not require bookstore to stock Brailled
books).
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individuals.2 7 The language "with a good [or] service... different... from
that provided to other individuals" logically extends to the content or nature
of the good itself.276 Therefore, discrimination in the terms of an insurance
policy violates this section by providing an insured with a policy, the contents
ofwhich differ on the basis of a disability from that provided to other individuals.277
The Parkercourt incorrectly concluded that Title III does not govern the
contents of the goods or services offered by a place of public accommodation.27' The court completely ignored DOJ statements that are directly applicable to insurance279 and instead relied on DOJ regulations that, when closely
examined, do not support the court's suggestion that Title III does not apply
to the contents of goods, and specifically to the terms of insurance plans.280
The language of Title III supports the view that Title III governs the contents
of goods and services.
D. IndividualsNeed Not Obtain Goods Directlyfrom
PublicAccommodation
The Parkercourt determined that an employer-provided insurance plan
is not a good that a place of public accommodation offers because the public
cannot enter the office of the insurance company and obtain the same plan.28 2
The court relied on the DOJ's explanation of whether wholesale establishments are places of public accommodation as support for this conclusion.283
The DOJ explained that Title III covers wholesale establishments as places of
public accommodation except those that sell exclusively to other businesses
275.
276.

ADA § 302(b)(1)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1994).
Doukas, 950 F. Supp. at 426 (quoting ADA § 302(b)(1)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C.

§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii)).

277. See id. (explaining that discrimination in terms of insurance plan violates Section 302(b)(1)(A)(iii) because insurer is providing individual with good or service different
from that provided to others).
278. See supranotes 260-77 and accompanying text (providing analysis that refutes Parker
court's determination that Title III does not govern contents of goods or services).
279. See supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text (describing Parkercourt's ignorance
of DOJ regulations that are directly applicable to insurance).
280. See supranotes 259-73 and accompanying text (explaining Parkercourt's reliance
upon irrelevant DOJ regulations).
281. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (providing language of Title III as
support for view that Title III governs contents of goods and services).
282. Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc),

cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
283. Id. at 1011-12.
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and not to individuals.284 The Parkercourt thus concluded that a disability
policy offered solely to a business is not a service or good of a place of public
accommodation." 5 The statutory language and legislative history of Title I
and the DOJ regulations implementing Title III demonstrate that the Parker
court erred in arriving at this conclusion."'
Under the plain language of Title I, an insurance office is a place of
public accommodation2 7 that provides insurance policies as goods or services
under Title III.28 In Lewis, the court determined that an insurer may not
discriminate in the provision of insurance policies regardless of whether the
insurer sells the policy directly to the individual or provides it to the individ-

ual indirectly through the employer pursuant to a contractual or other relationship.289 In arriving at this conclusion, the court focused on language stating

that Title III prohibits discrimination which a public accommodation inflicts
either directly or indirectly through contractual or other arrangements.2' This
language is located in the Title III provisions that prohibit a denial of participation by an individual with a disability,29 that prohibit affording an individual with a disability the opportunity to participate or benefit from a good or
service that is not equal to the opportunity afforded to other individuals, 2 2 and
that forbid the provision of a good or service that is different from that pro-

284. See id. (citing 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B., at 604 (1996)).
285. Id. at 1012; see Brewster v. Cooley Assoc., No. CIV. 97-0058 M/LFG, 1997 WL
823634, at * 1 (D.N.M. Nov. 6, 1997) (agreeing with Parkercourt's conclusion that benefit plan
offered by employer is not good offered by place of public accommodation).
286. See infra notes 287-317 and accompanying text (analyzing Title III's language and
legislative history and DOJ regulations implementing Title III).
287. See supranotes 168-85 and accompanying text (demonstrating that insurance office
is place of public accommodation).
288. See Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 425 (D.N.H. 1996)
(stating that insurance office is public accommodation that Title HI prohibits "from discriminating on the basis of disability in the provision of a good or service, which includes insurance
products").
289. Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1997).
290. See id. (emphasizing language "directly, or through contractual, licensing or other
arrangements" located in Section 302(b)(1)(A)(i)).
291. See ADA § 302(b)(1)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i) (1994) (stating that "[i]t
shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individuals on the basis of a disability... directly, or through contractual,licensing, or other arrangements,to a denial of the
opportunity... to participate in or benefit from the goods [or] services" (emphasis added)).
292. See ADA § 302(b)(l)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii) (stating that "[i]t shall
be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability...
directly, or through contractual,licensing, or other arrangementswith the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from a good [or] service.., that is not equal to that afforded to other
individuals" (emphasis added)).
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vided to other individuals.293 The Parkercourt failed to consider the contractual provision.2
In the legislative history of Title III, the Committee on Education and
Labor describedthe intentbehindthe contractual provision.295 The Committee
statedthatthe intent ofthe provision is to preventapublic accommodation from
doing indirectly through a contractual relationship what Title I prohibits it
from doing directly.2' When an insurance company issues an employer-provided plan, the company does not directly provide the plan to the employees.297
Rather, the insurance company indirectly provides the insurance to employees
by virtue of the contractual arrangement between the insurance company and
the employer.298 Title III prohibits an insurance company from discriminating
in the terms of an insurance plan when it directly provides the plan to an individual, such as when an individual personally contacts the insurance company
in order to answer the plan.2 Therefore, to conform to the intent of the contractual provision of Title III, courts should hold that Title I also prohibits an
insurance company from discriminating in the terms of an insurance plan when
the company provides the plan to the employees through a contractual relationship that the insurance company has with their employer.3" Although the
public cannotenter into the office ofan insurance company and obtain the same
insurance policy that an employer provides to an employee, 0' the insurance
293. See ADA § 302(b)(1)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (stating that"[i]t shall
be discriminatory to provide an individual ...on the basis of a disability... directly, or
through contractual, licensing, or other arrangementswith a good [or] service... that is
different or separate from that provided to other individuals" (emphasis added)).
294. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (referencing Title III language only to support argument that good must be from place of
public accommodation), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
295. See H.1. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 101 (1990) (describing intent of contractual
provision in Title II), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 384.
296. Id.; see 28 C.F.Rt pt. 36, app. B, at 611 (1996) (stating that "[tihe intent of the
contractual prohibitions... is to prohibit a public accommodation from doing indirectly,
through a contractual relationship, what it may not do directly").
297. See 1 RUSS, supra note 48, at § 7.1 (stating that central entity, such as employer,
operates middle position between insurer and employees).
298. See I id, (stating that employer, as central entity between insurance company and
employees, has primary contractual relationship with insurance company).
299. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text (demonstrating that discrimination
in terms of insurance plans violates Section 302(b)(1)(A)(iii)).
300. Seesupranote296 and accompanying text (discussing intent of contractual provision
of Title III).
301. See Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
bane) (stating that public cannot enter office of insurance company and obtain long-term
disability policy that plaintiff obtained), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 871 (1998).
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company is still providing its good, in the form of an insurance policy, to the
employee."0 2 The insurance office could not provide its insurance plan to the
employees on a group basis without the contract with the employer. 03 Therefore, the insurance policy is a good of the place of public accommodation
regardless of whether the insurance company provides it directly or through
an employer.
The Parkercourt mistakenly relied upon the DOJ's explanations ofwhen
wholesale establishments are places of public accommodations.'s 4 In its
explanation, the DOJ provided an example of a wholesale establishment that
is not a place of public accommodation under Title 11.2 5 The DOJ suggested
that a company which grows food produce and supplies the crops exclusively
to food processing corporations on a wholesale basis is not a public accommodation when it transacts with the corporations." ° In such a case, the offering
of the crops to the food processing corporations is not a service or a good of
a place of public accommodation 0 7
Insurance companies issuing employer-provided insurance plans are
distinguishable from wholesalers that sell only to businesses. The DOJ
provided the wholesaler explanation in orderto answer commenters' concerns
about the coverage of wholesale establishments under the category of "sales
and rental establishments" as listed in Section 301(7).308 The DOJ explained
that jewelry stores, pet stores, and bookstores are included in the category of
"sales and rental establishments.""s Then, the DOJ stated that a wholesale
establishment is not included in that category when the wholesaler sells solely
to businesses and not to individuals." The key distinction is the fact that the
302. See 1Russ, supranote48,at § 7:1 (stating thatgroup members are ultimate insureds).
303.
See 1 id (statingthatgroup insurance policy involves contract between central entity,
such as employer, and insurer).
304. See supra notes 283-84 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ's explanation
concerning wholesale establishments).
305. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 604 (1996) (providing example ofpublic accommodation selling exclusively to other businesses and not to individuals and therefore not falling
within purview of Title III).
306. Id.
307. See Parkerv. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011-12 (6th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (relying upon DOJ's food wholesaler example as support for conclusion that offering of
disability policy on discounted rate to business is not service or good offered by place of public
accommodation), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).

308. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B, at 604 (stating that commentators were concerned over
coverage of wholesale establishments under category of "sales or rental establishments").
309. Id.
310. See id. (stating that wholesale establishments are places of public accommodation
under category of "sales or rental establishments" except when they sell exclusively to businesses and not to individuals).
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wholesaler does not sell to individuals, whereas jewelry stores, pet stores, and
bookstores typically do sell to individuals.'
In the wholesaler example, the food wholesaler does not sell to individu3 12
als and would not consider the potential individual purchasers of its crops.
However, an insurance company that issues an employer-provided insurance
plan provides insurance to the employees.3 13 Although the employer contracts
with the insurance company, the individual group member is the insured and
ultimately receives the protection offered by the insurance company. 3 4 The
insurance company therefore considers the individuals who might become the
beneficiaries of the group insurance plan.1 5 In relation to losses suffered, the
employee is like any other policyholder and may directly contact the insurance
company.3 16 Therefore, unlike a wholesale establishment selling exclusively
to other businesses, an insurance company issuing employer-provided insurance plans offers its good - insurance plans -to the individual employees and
is in a position to consider the characteristics of individuals in determining the
terms of the insurance plans.3 17
The Parker court thus erred in arguing that a benefit plan which an
employer offers is not a good that a public accommodation offers. 3" The fact
that an employee obtains the insurance policy through the employer rather
than directly from the insurance company does not defeat the employee's Title
Mn claim. 1 9 The language and legislative history of Title III indicate Congress's intent to prohibit exactly what the insurance company is doing in such
a case: indirectly providing a good in a discriminatory fashion when direct
provision of that same good would violate Title MI.2'
311.

See id (stressing that reason that wholesaler selling exclusively to businesses is

excluded from category under which jewelry stores, pet stores, and bookstores fall is because
wholesaler does not sell to individuals).
312. See id.(explaining that food wholesaler sells exclusively to other businesses).
313. See IRUsS, supranote48, at§ 7:1 (statingthatgroupmembersareultimateinsureds).
314. See 1 id (stating that group members are ultimate insureds).
315. See 1id (stating that individual insured is at least sufficiently interested in insurance
contract between employer and insurance company; thus, insurance company should consider
individual's interests).
316. 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 285 (1993).
317. Seesupranotes314-16 and accompanying text (arguingthatwholesale establishment
is unlike insurance company that issues employer-provided insurance plans).
318. See supranotes 147-54 and accompanying text (providing Parkercourt's conclusion
that benefit plan is not good of place of public accommodation).
319. See supranotes 287-3 03 and accompanying text (demonstrating that indirect relationship between employee and insurer does not defeat employee's Title III claim).
320. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text (describing Congress's intent in
including contractual provision in Title III).
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V1 Conclusion

Insurance is critical to millions of Americans with disabilities because it
" ' Unfortunately,
provides them with the means to participate fully in society.32
these individuals face discrimination in the terms of their employer-provided
insurance plans. 3" Because of the subtle nature of this discrimination, courts
have experienced difficulty in identifying and examining this discrimination
and remain hopelessly mired in the confusing language of Title III of the
ADA.3" The two federal courts of appeals that have considered Title In
within the context of employer-provided insurance did not sufficiently analyze
the Title III inquiry and thus failed to provide adequate guidance concerning
the scope of Title III protections within the context of employer-provided
insurance plans.32
The determination of an employee's Title III claim within this context
involves a careful consideration of four factors. 3 Careful consideration of
each factor is crucial to determining the actual scope of Title III within this
subtle and unique context. 326 A close analysis of each of these factors reveals
that the scope of Title III is broad enough to subject an insurance company to
liability on the basis of the discriminatory terms in an employer-provided
insurance plan. 321 Because insurance coverage aids individuals with disabilities in becoming full members of society, this conclusion effectuates Congress's purpose in enacting the ADA to bring individuals
with disabilities into
3 28
the social and economic mainstream of American life.

321. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing importance of insurance to
individuals with disabilities).
322. See supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text (describing discriminatory terms of
employer-provided insurance plans).
323. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (explaining problems caused by subtle
nature of discrimination in terms of employer-provided insurance plans).
324. See supraPart IV.B (discussing Carpartscourt's Title III analysis); supraPart IV.C
(providing Parkercourt's Title III analysis).
325. Seesupranotes87-94 and accompanying text (describing fourfactors that courts must

analyze).
326. SeesupraPartIV.A (discussing subtlenature ofdiscrimination in employer-provided
plans and need for consideration of four factors).
327. See supraPart V (arguing that, based on analysis of four necessary factors, Title III
is broad enough to allow employee to have cause of action against insurance company that
issues employer-provided plan).
328. See supratext accompanying notes 9-10 (describing Congressional purpose in enacting ADA).
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